




Why politics is a special case
The topic ‘ethics in politics’ might cover a multitude of sins. Here it will be restricted to 
the ethics of politicians in representative liberal democracies. The ethics of public servants 
will be left aside, as will be the ethics of politicians in other political systems. Plain criminal 
wrongdoing by politicians will also be outside our scope. The subject is still very large. 
It includes all those matters that refl ect on a politician’s ethical reputation. Political 
wrongdoing can range in magnitude from taking a country to war on inadequate grounds 
to fi ddling with one’s parliamentary expenses. 
Political thinkers have always been concerned about the temptations that power presents. 
Alexis de Tocqueville put it this way: ‘[T]o pillage the public purse and to sell the favours 
of the state are arts that the meanest villain can understand and hope to practice in his 
turn’ (Tocqueville 1835, Chapter 13). More famously, Lord Acton remarked that ‘Power 
tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Great men are almost always bad 
men...’ (Acton 1907, Appendix). Acton’s saying is usually misrepresented as the categorical 
‘power corrupts’, and in that form it is at best only half true. It would be more accurate to 
say that sometimes power corrupts to some degree. In any case, power must be employed 
if government is to be possible. Modern states possess a monopoly of legitimate violence, 
even if they rarely have to use that violence (Weber 1919/1994). Merely having such power 
available to them makes governments and politicians subject to the temptations of abuse 
and misuse.
Politics is a public activity, not just in the sense of being open to public scrutiny, but in the 
much stronger sense that politics deals with public power, and such power is held in trust 
from the community. Public power is the recognised authority to make binding decisions, 
decisions that will be enforced by the police and the courts. The quality of those decisions 
will affect the lives and fortunes of many. Ethics in politics is therefore a matter of great 
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concern. The diffi cult problem, however, is to say what sort of ethics is applicable in the 
political arena.
Politics is not a profession (it is not based on a body of knowledge), it is not a kind of 
commercial activity, and it is not a form of corporate employment, so none of the well-
known ethical guidelines that apply to these activities can be applied straightforwardly to 
political conduct. At least for legislators, the obligations of public offi ce are not covered by 
any job description, and they are not enforced by any system of management. In the absence 
of any corporate structure, the standard understanding of whistleblowing does not apply.
Is politics a form of public service? There are two factors (at least) that differentiate politics 
from the public service. Firstly, politicians are our ultimate decision-makers, whereas 
public servants are not. Politicians therefore have both more power and a different kind of 
power, and public servants may not encroach on that power. Secondly, public servants are 
employees of the state, and thus have a contract defi ning their role, whereas politicians are 
not employees and are not contract-bound; their role is only loosely defi ned, and that must 
be the case if they are to do their job well. For politicians, answerability is to the electorate, 
to their fellow members of parliament, to their party, and to the law. For public servants, 
answerability is to their managers and then fi nally to the relevant minister. Given these 
differences, the ethics that applies will be different, though both can misbehave similarly 
in that they can misuse public power and authority.
Being the highest decision-making bodies, parliaments see themselves as self-governing 
and as making the fi nal decisions on the behaviour of their members. This is the theory 
of parliamentary privilege. In the case of the Australian Federal Parliament, its legal 
basis set out in the Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987. The details of this privilege can be 
technical, but in broad terms members of parliament are subject to the normal operation 
of the law when acting in their private capacities, but when acting in their proper role as 
parliamentarians they are outside the jurisdiction of the courts. This allows them to speak 
freely about controversial matters. Members of parliament can be punished by parliament 
itself for breach of privilege. Beyond that, accountability is to the electorate, and thus to 
democracy. Of course, parliamentary privilege does not by itself make an action morally 
acceptable, but it does show that society recognises that political actions should be judged on 
somewhat different grounds from the actions of ordinary citizens. How well the institution 
of parliamentary privilege achieves its aims can still be debated, and much depends on 
how sharply the distinction between public and private roles can be drawn (Wigley 2003).
In a representative democracy, political offi ce is a form of trusteeship and trusteeship is an 
ethical concept with specifi c implications. As Uhr has put it, ‘at the end of the day, much 
of the most valuable work of democratic government requires substantial delegations of 
public trust to allow government offi cials to manage public affairs’ (Uhr 2005, pp. 19-20). 
Politicians make decisions on behalf of the community. They generally offer an ethical or 
quasi-ethical rationale for the policies they advocate. Ideals such as the national interest, the 
public interest, the common good, justice, liberty, and protecting the vulnerable are plainly 
ethical ideals; while other ideals such as economic development, economic effi ciency and 
protecting the environment are, generally speaking, ethically respectable. Policies not at 
least ostensibly grounded in a rationale of some such sort are rare in liberal democracies. In 
that sense, ethics is central to politics and government.
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Politicians attempt to resolve confl icts that cannot be resolved by voluntary agreement 
in the general community. Such confl icts commonly arise from moral disputes and 
disagreements, not just about appropriate individual behaviour but also about the proper 
structure of society. Often deep moral complexity – the confl ict of right and right (where 
both sides believe they are justifi ed) – is the source of the problem. Legislators should 
aim to devise laws that serve the common good of society, when society itself is divided 
about what it regards as the common good. There are usually no clear indicators of success, 
comparable for example to the role of profi tability or share prices or net worth in the 
commercial world. Public money is always in short supply, so decisions are usually trade-
offs between competing goods, rather than choices between right and wrong. Thus, the 
tasks that confront politicians often far exceed the diffi culty of everyday issues.
There is a further complication. Politicians are usually, in part, the product of a party 
system, to which they therefore owe some allegiance. Their role is thus twofold: to defend 
and promote the party version of the common good that got them elected, and to respect 
those who hold a version different from their own, since their views make up part of the 
community’s self-understanding. Striking the right balance between these is not easy. In 
the ordinary run of affairs the politician in a party-based democracy must speak for his 
party’s view of things. In the system of party politics, politicians seem to have to operate 
under the rule which says: policy X is a good thing when advocated by my party, but 
a bad thing when advocated by the rival party. The ethics of politics has to be to some 
degree adversarial, though it should not be entirely so, and on special occasions all sides 
in the political game should come together in the name of what the wider community 
fundamentally agrees upon – that is, the values of liberal democracy.
Politicians are subjected to pressures far beyond those of everyday civilian life. Media 
scrutiny can be intense. Strenuous and manipulative lobbying on behalf of powerful interest 
groups is a hazard that has to be negotiated. Political parties impose their own often harsh 
disciplines, as do factions within parties. Fellow politicians are often opinionated, ambitious 
and ego-driven. Constituency members often see ‘their’ politicians as all-purpose problem-
solvers, expecting them to pursue a multiplicity of personal and sectional interests. In 
addition, the requirement to show one’s face at an endless success of community functions 
leaves little time for family life.
No-one is conscripted into politics, and the pitfalls of a political career path are well known, 
so there are no grounds for arguing that the pressures of political life might excuse unethical 
behaviour. Politicians take on political offi ce voluntarily, and take an oath of offi ce to serve 
the public good. Faced with a seemingly impossible ethical situation, it is always possible 
to resign.
If we accept that politics in a representative liberal democracy is a special kind of activity, then 
we may agree that it will involve a special kind of ethics and that it will not be appropriate 
to judge politicians by the same standards as we judge everyday behaviour. Standards for 
politicians may be seen as ‘higher’ or as ‘lower’ than those that apply in everyday life, but 
they will be different from those standards. Political activity involves special privileges and 
special responsibilities, and political ethics should refl ect both dimensions. This is not an 
original contention. It has long been argued that moral idealism is not an adequate basis 
for political life. As Machiavelli observed, ‘There is such a difference between the way 
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we really live and the way we ought to live that the man who neglects the real to study 
the ideal will learn how to accomplish his ruin, not his salvation’ (The Prince, Chapter 10, 
section 15). He may also bring ruin on those who follow him because he and his cause 
will be outsmarted by others with opposing causes who have not neglected to study the 
real. More recently, philosophers have discussed at length the morality of ‘dirty hands’ 
(Walzer 1973; Coady 1993; Nagel 1991; Thompson 1987). Good politicians must aim to be 
both ethical and effective, but effectiveness is often in tension with the demands of ethics.
Ethics in Australian politics
The evidence on the ethical standards of Australian politics is somewhat paradoxical. On 
the one hand, surveys of the general public show that politicians are held in low esteem 
(Goot 2002; Leigh 2010, pp. 50-52; Uhr 2005). On the other hand, international comparisons 
show the ethical standards of Australian governments in a good light. According to 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2010, Australia ranks as the 
eighth least corrupt out of 178 countries (Transparency International 2010).
Popular distrust of governments has led to demands for greater ethical accountability. 
Such demands go back to the 1980s, and the scandals in government in Queensland under 
Sir Joh Bjelke-Petersen and in Western Australia under Brian Burke clearly play a large part 
in their genesis. And, as Uhr observes, it is not only the general public that issues calls for 
accountability:
The language of ethics now comprises its own distinctive policy discourse 
refl ecting emerging demands on democratic governance caused by doubts about 
the sustainability of public confi dence in government. Where do these doubts 
come from? Surprisingly perhaps, they frequently come from governments 
themselves, particularly from the elected political executives who sense the 
need to ‘do something’ to repair the reputation of politics and the standing of 
public life. Governments want us to believe in them, in the basic political sense 
of believing in the trustworthiness of government, at the political as well as the 
bureaucratic level. (Uhr 2005, p. 29)
The standards for politicians must in some way be grounded in generally accepted ethics. 
One way to ensure this is to ask the general public to clarify what it considers to be the 
appropriate standards for political life. A study of this topic by McAllister found a rough 
agreement between a sample of opinions held by the general public and members of the 
political elite on the ethical requirements applicable to legislators. McAllister distinguished 
between eight principles of conduct. In all but one of the eight cases, the public set these 
standards higher than did the elite (McAllister 2000). 
We can read this survey as showing broad agreement or signifi cant disagreement between 
the public’s and the elite’s views of political ethics. It may be read as illustrating the maxim 
that citizens typically expect higher standards of conduct of elected offi cials than they do 
of themselves. However, it may also be read as showing that those closer to an issue – in 
this case, the politicians – see more complexities than do those further away. The politicians 
may understand that it is not ethically required to always put the public interest ahead of 
their personal interests, recognising that even politicians deserve some privacy and have 
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ordinary concerns of family life, for example. Or they may interpret ‘favouring special 
interests’ to include the legitimate special interests of their constituents. Whatever view we 
take of this evidence, it seems right in principle that in a representative democracy political 
ethics should refl ect the public’s view of acceptable political conduct. This may seem truistic, 
but in professional ethics, the opposite is the case: the public’s view of professional conduct 
and misconduct is usually given less moral weight than the intra-professional perspective, 
and for that reason alleged professional misconduct is judged by fellow professionals.
Various procedures and mechanisms can be used to strengthen the ethical accountability 
of governments (Uhr 1998, pp. 151-209). These come in two forms – internal and external.
Internal accountability has two main aspects. The fi rst is parliamentary self-regulation. 
As Uhr describes it,
each house of the Commonwealth parliament has a privileges committee 
responsible for investigating the professional ethics of members, including the 
professional standing of relationships between members on parliamentary 
committees, their witnesses and others named in proceedings. These committees 
act as the conscience of parliament, articulating case by case the professional ethics 
that parliament judges itself by. These committees provide valuable case studies 
of the capacity of parliaments to regulate their own affairs. (Uhr 2005, p. 149)
Table 15.1 Public and elite perceptions of ethical behaviour
How important do you think it is for 







... respect the dignity and privacy of 
members of the public
75 55 +20
... use public resources economically 75 50 +25
... act honestly at all times 74 73 +1
... always put the public interest ahead of 
their personal interests
73 59 +14
... always tell the truth to the public 73 51 +22
... always behave in a dignifi ed manner 59 48 +11
... not favour special interests 49 23 +26
... refuse to accept gifts of any kind 46 24 +22
Mean 66 48 +18
N 1794 105
Source: McAllister I 2000, ‘Keeping them honest: Public and elite perceptions of ethical conduct among Australian 
legislators’, Political Studies, volume 48, pp. 22-37, at p. 28; based on 1996 Australian Election Study, voter and 
legislator samples.
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Importantly, the proceedings of these investigations are published on government websites. 
In the United Kingdom expenses scandal of 2009 (Winnett & Rayner 2009), one key issue 
was that the deliberations of the committee tasked with ruling on expenses claims were 
kept secret. When a whistleblower made this information public, the strong public reaction 
caused considerable damage to the reputations of otherwise well-regarded politicians. 
This could not have happened if transparency had been built into the process, as it is in 
Australian parliaments, and as it is now in Britain.
The adoption of codes of ethics and codes of conduct is the second internal method of 
attempting to strengthen accountability. When a code was proposed for the Australian 
parliament, it was made clear in advance that:
The purpose of a code would be to:
1. set public standards by which the behaviour of parliamentarians can be assessed;
2. provide a basis for assessing proposed actions and so guide behaviour;
3. provide an agreed foundation for responding to behaviour that is considered 
unacceptable; and
4. assure and reassure the community that the trust placed in parliamentarians is 
well placed.
In order for a code to be credible it must not only be aspirational but also 
contain clear guidelines and injunctions, prescriptions and prohibitions. (Brien 
1998-99) 
The working party that designed the proposed code set out eight broad ‘principles’ intended 
to ‘form the basis of the conduct which is expected of Australian federal legislators’. 
The eight were:
1. loyalty to the nation and regard for its laws;
2. diligence and economy;
3. respect for the dignity and privilege of others;
4. integrity;
5. primacy of the public interest;
6. proper exercise of infl uence;
7. personal conduct; and
8. additional responsibilities of parliamentary offi ce holders. (McAllister 2000, p. 27)
In this case, the proposal for a code was eventually rejected. However, most states do have 
codes of ethics for ordinary members of parliament. 
In reality, it is ministers who form the executive branch of government who in most matters 
exercise real power and who are most in need of ethical constraints (see Mulgan 2002). The 
Australian federal parliament did adopt a code of ministerial conduct in 1996; fi ve ministers 
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lost their positions in that term of parliament for minor offences to do with pecuniary 
interests and travel allowances. Since then, the code has had only as much force as the 
Prime Minister of the day deems it to have (Kelly 2011, p. 259). This may illustrate how 
diffi cult it is to design codes that refl ect the accepted standards of conduct. As Uhr remarks,
Democratic public integrity can never be fully ‘systematised’ or ‘rationalised’. 
It will always be mediated by politics. … Not every detail of appropriate 
conduct can be codifi ed in advance: codes of ethics can summarise the spirit 
of responsible use of public offi ces, leaving offi cials with the duty of managing 
their own conduct in ways that are consistent with prevailing law but largely 
unregulated by detailed legal instruments (Uhr 2005, p. 26).
The most common forms of external accountability are:
1. Reports by auditors-general and ombudsmen
2. Senate or Upper House inquiries into particular government activities
3. Royal Commissions into particular government activities
4. Independent statutory integrity commissions.
Bodies such as these have mainly an advisory, guidance or educative status, though they 
may also have the power to recommend prosecution. Strictly speaking they do not derogate 
from the formal powers and privileges of parliaments. Commissions can reach adverse 
fi ndings against individuals that can be referred to police and public prosecutors, and can 
make fi ndings that will have considerable persuasive force.
In general, all of these external and internal mechanisms and procedures attempt to arrive 
at a clearer and sharper ethical analysis of government and political behaviour than occurs 
in the normal course of events. This could be so only if the codes or commissions bring to 
bear sharper ethical concepts or judgements than are commonly used. 
When a royal commission declares that certain legal but ethically dubious behaviour is 
‘improper conduct’, without any sharper analysis of how such a term is defi ned and how 
improper conduct is recognised as such, we seem to be at the limits of conceptual clarity. 
Thereafter, the matter falls under the jurisdiction of personal judgement, with plenty of 
room left for good faith disagreement. The ultimate form of accountability is the free and 
fair election, which puts adjudication of such disagreements into the hands of the citizens.
A different problem arises when the ethical credentials of the electoral system or the 
constitution are called into question. Clearly corrupt elections are unlikely to resolve 
the problem of a corrupt electoral system. But the ethics of that sort of situation go far 
beyond the scope of this discussion, which is confi ned to political ethics within liberal 
democracies.
Strengthening ethical practices
The founder of the Australian Democrats, Don Chipp, coined a phrase that has resonated 
in the vernacular when he said in 1980 that his party would undertake to ‘keep the 
bastards honest’. Chipp’s idea was that a third party would be able to improve the ethical 
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performance of the two main sides of Australian politics. The phrase has outlived his party, 
and the task remains a perennial one. In recent decades, the trend has been to move from 
parliamentary self-regulation, governed by an ethic of responsibility, to the establishment 
of various bodies and codes, guided by an ethic of accountability. More broadly, political 
life relies on six kinds of ethical control (apart from the personal values and responsibility 
of individual politicians):
1. self-regulation, under the theory of parliamentary privilege;
2. accountability to external regulatory bodies;
3. legal accountability;
4. media scrutiny;
5. public debate, including internet debate; and
6. free and fair elections.
Here we have focused on the fi rst two forms of control. Whether going further in the 
accountability direction would strengthen ethical performance is at least doubtful, since 
the fundamental problem of quis custodes custodiet? (who governs the governors?) is 
unavoidable. The more power is placed in the hands of accountability bodies, the more 
attention shifts to the performance of those bodies and to the personnel that occupy them. 
To the extent that members of parliament are fallible and corruptible by power, to exactly 
the same extent will be the members of accountability bodies when power is transferred 
to them.
Outright corruption does not seem to be deeply entrenched in Australian governments. 
Isolated acts of misconduct do not amount to a systemic ethical problem – it is well 
understood that ethical problems are most serious when individual misconduct is covered 
up or offi cially denied, thus threatening to become structural or systemic. External 
accountability systems are well-suited to deal with that sort of wrongdoing.
Public distrust or disgust may arise more from observing a steady stream of petty point-
scoring, subterfuge, evasion and half-truths than from concern about serious political 
corruption. The ethics of accountability is not suited to deal with those kinds of ethical 
shortcomings. The ethics of responsibility also fails this test, simply because it has no 
answer on how to improve the performance of those who are under-performing.
Another possibility is at least worth consideration. Granted that Australia is a leading and 
longstanding liberal democracy, that it has free and fair elections, and that its politicians 
are rarely corrupt, it still remains possible that the democratic processes have become run-
down and even decrepit. Party membership and activity are at an all-time low (Leigh 2010, 
pp. 59-66), yet, despite this, politics is party-dominated. Selection into politics is from a 
narrow range of candidates. Suspicion about the low standards of political ethics may be 
better addressed by fi nding ways to broaden entry into political life, rather than by further 
regulation in the name of accountability.
Chapter 15 – Ethics in politics
185
References
Acton, J D (Lord Acton), 1907, Historical Essays and Studies in J N Figgis & R V Laurence (eds), 
Macmillan, London.
Brien, A 1998-99, A Code of Conduct for Parliamentarians? Australian Parliamentary Library Research 
Paper 2, viewed 30/9/2011, <http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rp/1998-99/
99rp02.htm>.
Coady, T 1993, ‘Dirty hands’, in R E Goodin & P Pettit (eds), A Companion to Contemporary 
Political Philosophy, Oxford, Blackwell, pp. 422-30.
Dobel, J P 1999, Public Integrity, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.
Goot, M 2002, ‘Distrustful, disenchanted and disengaged?’, in D Burchell & A Leigh (eds), 
The Prince’s New Clothes: Why do Australians dislike their politicians?, UNSW Press, Sydney, 
pp. 9-46.
Leigh, A 2010, Disconnected, New South, Sydney.
Kelly, P 2011, The March of Patriots: The struggle for modern Australia, Melbourne University 
Press, Melbourne.
Machiavelli, N 1532, The Prince (many editions).
McAllister, I 2000, ‘Keeping them honest: Public and elite perceptions of ethical conduct among 
Australian legislators’, Political Studies, 48: 22-37.
Mulgan, R 2002, ‘On ministerial resignations (and the lack thereof)’, Australian Journal of Public 
Administration, 61 (1): 121-7.
Nagel, T 1991, ‘Ruthlessness in public life’, in Mortal Questions, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, pp. 75-90.
Thompson, D 1987, Political Ethics and Public Offi ce, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts.
Tocqueville, A de 1835, Democracy in America (many editions).
Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index, 2011, viewed 30/9/2011 <http://
www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results>.
Uhr, J 1998, Deliberative Democracy in Australia: The changing place of Parliament, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge.
Uhr, J 2005, Terms of Trust: Arguments over ethics in Australian government, University of New 
South Wales Press, Sydney.
Walzer, M 1973, ‘Political action: The problem of dirty hands’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 
2: 160-80.
Weber, M 1919/1994, in Weber: Political Writings, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Wigley, S 2003, ‘Parliamentary immunity: Protecting democracy or protecting corruption?’, 
Journal of Political Philosophy, 11 (1): 23-40.
Winnett, R & Rayner, G 2009, No Expenses Spared, Bantam, London.
